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Abstract
The extent to which environmental regulatory institutions are either ‘green’
or ‘brown’ impacts not just the intensity of regulation at any moment, but also
the incentives for the development of new pollution-control technologies. We
set up a strategic model of R&D in which a polluter can deploy technologies
developed in-house, or license technologies developed by specialist outsiders.
Polluters exert R&D effort and may even develop redundant technologies to
improve the terms on which they procure technology from outside. We find
that, while regulatory bias has an ambiguous impact on the best-available
technology, strategic delegation to systematically biased regulators can im-
prove social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Policy choices typically involve balancing one category of costs against another. The
standard prescription, in accordance with maximization of social welfare, requires
that policy-designers should weight the various categories of costs equally. There are
notable exceptions: analyzing the tradeoff between the costs of inflation and unem-
ployment, Rogoff (1985: 1169) pointed out that “Society can often make itself better
off by appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function,
but instead places ‘too large’ a weight on inflation relative to unemployment.”
Environmental regulation, in particular, may involve balancing the costs of pol-
lution damage against the costs incurred in emissions reduction. We consider a
setting in which, by design, environmental regulators may attach greater or less
emphasis on environmental concerns relative to other impact of their policies. The
introduction of an attitude parameter allows us to capture how ‘green’ or ‘brown’ the
regulator is, akin to the ‘conservativeness’ of Rogoff’s central banker.1 We develop,
in this setting, a dynamic model in which the regulatory attitude affects not only the
stringency of abatement standards at any moment in time, but also the incentives
to develop new pollution-control technologies. In the spirit of Rogoff’s conclusion,
we show that society can typically make itself better-off by establishing an envi-
ronmental regulatory regime that appears to over - or under -weight environmental
impacts.
In fact, regulation is often delegated to specialist agencies whose attitudes may
well diverge from social preference.2 While we can view regulators’ bias as a taste
parameter, in our preferred interpretation such biases are a feature of institutional
design, and embodied in agency procedures and practices. In the conduct of cost-
benefit analyses (CBA), for example, agencies have a plethora of rules and guidelines
relating to the methods to be used in the monetization of costs and benefits, dis-
counting practices, the scope of studies, the categories of costs and benefits that
are admissible, etc., so the CBA can favor one side of the equation or the other
1When the US President nominates an EPA Administrator the ‘green’ credentials of candidates
are debated, often with reference to environmental ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ – see Cohen (2001) for such
assessment of President Bush’s prospective appointees.
2In the broader literature on regulation a number of authors refer to pro-industry versus pro-
consumer regulators – see, for example, Arocena et al. (2002), and Moita and Paiva (2006).
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(Adler and Posner (1999), Gayer and Hahn (2005)). For example, Driesen (2006:
335) has argued that CBA practices at the US Environmental Protection Agency
are ‘anti-environmental’ in that they under-weight environmental elements relative
to a neutral benchmark.
There may be, as Rogoff pointed out, sound reasons to design institutions that de-
part from the neutral benchmark. In a model of environmental regulation, Amacher
and Malik (1996) analyze the case where regulatory standards are set through bar-
gaining between the regulator and the regulated firm. In the context of their model,
they find that from a social welfare perspective a regulator who attaches less im-
portance to the firm’s compliance costs than it does to environmental damage and
enforcement costs may achieve a better outcome than a neutral regulator. In other
words, their ‘ideal regulator’ is one who is biased in favor of environmental concerns.
We seek to characterize the ideal environmental regulator in a model where the
regulatory bias affects, among other things, the degree of innovation in pollution
control technologies. In our model the regulatory attitude is captured by a parameter
γ, which refers to the weight that the regulatory agency places on environmental
benefits relative to the direct costs imposed by regulation. This is similar in spirit to
that used in Amacher and Malik (1996), though we do not have enforcement costs.
The value γ = 1 corresponds to a ‘neutral’ or unbiased regulator; values larger
than unity describe regulators who are relatively ‘green’ and lower values refer to
those who are ‘brown’. This ‘greenness’ parameter affects the choice of regulatory
standards directly and, through that, affects the incentives to invest in R&D that
leads to new abatement technologies.
Our model explores a setting in which the regulator is unable to commit (or can
commit only imperfectly) to any regulatory standard in advance of the innovation
process. If so, R&D is carried out anticipating the impact that development of
innovative technologies will have on the calibration of future regulatory standards.
There is a potential time-inconsistency problem if the chosen regulatory standard
aims not only to correct the static pollution externality but also to induce the
socially-optimal level of innovation. In general the ex-post (after innovation has
occurred) optimal regulatory policy deviates from the ex-ante optimal when effects
on R&D incentives are taken into account. In such situations credible delegation to
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a biased regulator can mitigate the time-inconsistency problem.3
How green or brown should our ideal environmental regulator be? We find that
the direction and the extent of the bias is sensitive to the innovation process. We de-
part from the existing literature in allowing for two potential sources of innovation:
(a) the polluters themselves, who can develop in-house technologies to reduce the
cost of complying with pollution abatement regulations, and (b) specialist outside
firms, who are not engaged in polluting activity themselves but develop technolo-
gies that they license to polluting firms. The existing literature assumes that R&D
is done either by the polluting industry or by outside firms engaged in supplying
pollution-control technologies, but never both.4 This is unsatisfactory since in most
real settings we could expect to find significant R&D efforts exerted both by the
polluting sector itself and by outsiders. Lanjouw and Mody (1999) estimate that
worldwide 80% of patents for pollution control technologies are taken out by out-
siders, 20% by insiders. Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003)
and others evidence the outlays on pollution-control R&D made by polluting firms
and the environmental services sector.
Consistent with these stylized facts, and in a marked departure from the existing
literature, we assume that new abatement technologies emerge from the competitive
R&D choices of the regulated polluting firm (‘insider’) and a specialist entrepreneur
(‘outsider’). The outsider conducts R&D in order to obtain a patent and license the
abatement technology to the insider. The insider invests in R&D to develop better
technologies for its own use, or to strengthen its bargaining position with respect to
the outsider thereby reducing the license fee it must pay. The R&D choices of the
two firms are inter-dependent and the strategic interaction between them – absent
by assumption from all existing analyzes of environmental R&D – is central to our
3We discuss our modeling specification below, but note that it fits the trend – in environmental
economics and more widely – towards emphasizing the need for time-consistent policies. See
Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) for a seminal treatment of the more general literature on strategic
delegation.
4Much of the related literature, including most seminal papers, assume R&D is done internally.
For the latter approach see Parry (1995), Requate (2005b) and an excellent recent paper by Greaker
and Rosendahl (2008). The extensive literature exploring the relationship between environmental
policy and innovation is surveyed by Jaffe and Stavins (2002). In the more general literature on
environmental policy (not R&D) the existence of an upstream ‘environmental services’ industry
selling compliance-solutions to polluters has been acknowledged: see, for instance, the excellent
paper by David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005).
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analysis. We show that R&D effort of the insider is increasing in the R&D efforts
of the outsider, whilst the efforts of the latter are decreasing in the efforts of the
former.
We examine the equilibria of this R&D game. Our primary focus is on equilibria
in which both parties engage in inventive activity, but it is the outsider who develops
the best technology (that is, one with lowest unit abatement cost), and it is this
technology that is used for pollution abatement. We also describe equilibria in
which a high level of R&D by the insider induces the outsider to abandon innovation
altogether. Our model contributes to the understanding of the relationship between
environmental institutions and green R&D and, to the best of our knowledge, is
the first to model a scenario where innovations may come from within the polluting
industry or from outside.
We analyze the impact of changes in the regulatory attitude parameter γ upon
(a) the terms of the strategic interaction between the two parties in the R&D game;
(b) the equilibrium ‘mix’ of in-house versus out-sourced R&D activity; (c) the new
technologies that emerge, including the best-available technology; (d) the licence
fees paid by polluters for pollution-control technologies; (e) expected environmental
quality and, most importantly, (f) social welfare. We find that the strategic inter-
action matters in that it can lead to R&D effort that exceeds or falls short of the
socially-optimal level.
The analysis allows us to characterize the optimal γ, and therefore to talk about
the optimal corrective ‘bias’ that a welfare-motivated polity should wish to embody
in its regulatory institutions. In contrast with the existing literature – notably
Amacher and Malik (1996) – we can identify circumstances where the ideal regulator
should be ‘brown’ relative to the neutral benchmark. To that extent, our analysis
offers an alternative efficiency interpretation to the perceived regulatory capture
interpretation of agency practices.
Whilst the focus of this paper is theoretical we point to consistency with stylized
facts. Section 2 sets-up the model and characterizes equilibria in the R&D game,
market for technology and regulatory decisions. Section 3 explores the question of
the ideal regulator. Section 4 concludes and identifies potential extensions.
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2 The Model
A firm generates pollution as a by-product of its business activity. Absent regulation,
its level of pollution is X. The regulator must choose some level of abatement a, in
order to reduce pollution level to (X − a).5
The abatement standard a chosen by the regulator will vary with his greenness –
the relative weight γ he attaches to abatement benefits relative to abatement costs.
We assume that γ is common knowledge and credible. It could be that γ is simply
announced and believed. But given the incentive here for cheap talk, in real-world
settings policy actors have credibly to establish their reputation through, say, the
manner in which they respond in a sequence of decision contexts. An appointee may
‘import’ a reputation for a particular set of attitudes from their previous activities.
Recall that our preferred interpretation of γ is as being embodied in regulatory
institutions and practices – the way in which cost-benefit analysis is conducted, for
example – in which case knowledge of γ can be assumed through observation of
those practices.
For any γ, the choice of the regulatory standard also varies with abatement cost,
which depends on the state of available technologies. An abatement technology
is characterized by constant marginal abatement cost c, so that the total cost of
achieving target abatement level a equals ac. The marginal abatement cost can be
lowered by investment in new technologies. We assume that R&D can be carried out
in-house by the polluting firm (‘insider’) or by an external entrepreneur (‘outsider’).
R&D expenditure r leads to a technology with marginal abatement cost c(r), where
c′ < 0 (higher R&D spending generates technologies with lower marginal abatement
5 We focus on quantitative standards because of their prevalence: as Hueth and Melkonyan
(2006) point out, “The regulation of environmental risk remains dominated by the use of stan-
dards. Although performance incentives (e.g. Pigovian taxes and emissions-trading programs) are
sometimes employed, standards remain the core component.” This is the case even with relatively
recent European legislation, where examples of quantitative restrictions include: (a) The London
Airports Noise Restrictions Notice (February 2007) places an upper bound on the noise from air-
craft allowed to land at London’s Heathrow and Gatwick airports; (b) UK’s Environment Agency
sets limits on air and water pollutant levels that power stations can emit; (c) The Waste Incinera-
tion Directive (2000/76/EC) places non-tradable quantitative limits on emissions of heavy metals
from incinerators; (d) The EC Battery Directive (2001/338/EC) limits the cadmium content of
batteries. We argue later that we could arm our regulator with a different instrument without
disturbing the essential insights.
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cost) and c′′ > 0 (there are diminishing returns to effort in research). Once a
technology is developed and patented, its parameters cannot be readily adjusted:
in reality, many technologies take considerable time to develop with only limited
possibilities of adjustment.
Our model incorporates two further simplifying assumptions. One, the innova-
tion process is deterministic. The return to R&D effort can be made stochastic
without varying our qualitative insights. Two, we assume that the outsider and in-
sider are equally adept at research, so that the innovation function c(r) is common
to them. We could extend our model to allow for different research capabilities,
and the advantage could plausibly go either way. On the one hand, the polluting
firm might benefit from its ‘inside’ knowledge of production practices and product
design to better develop an abatement technology. On the other hand, the outsider
might have higher generic innovative capability by virtue of its being a special-
ist research and engineering firm, equipped for, and with experience of, designing
pollution-control solutions across varied settings. Our assumption of common inno-
vation capability provides a useful benchmark since it ensures that any predicted
differences in research levels are not driven by differences in research capability.
In our model, the outsider invests in R&D in order to obtain a patent and license
its technology to the regulated firm. The insider invests either because it expects
to use its proprietary abatement technology or because investment strengthens its
bargaining position with respect to the outsider’s innovation, lowering the royalty
it must pay to the outsider. Thus, our innovation process is competitive: we ignore
the possibility of collaborative research between the insider and outsider, whilst
acknowledging the significance of research joint ventures (RJVs) in some real world
settings – see, for example Hackett (1995).6 The market for technology is assumed
to be efficient: if the outsider develops a lower-cost technology the surplus from
adopting that technology is shared between the two firms, so the insider has an
incentive to adopt it.
It is well-known that the assumed order of moves can have a significant impact
on outcomes in models of this sort. Amacher and Malik (2002) make a compelling
6The game of vertical RJV formation would be an interesting one to consider in future research,
with the returns to each party from participation in such a scheme being sensitive to regulatory
attitude. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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argument that in any particular case the most realistic sequencing of instrument-
calibration by regulators and technology-choice by firms is likely to vary according
to setting, and provide examples. In the model here we have the additional com-
plication of an R&D stage. It is helpful, then, to be explicit about the assumed
sequence of events:
• Stage 1: Principal installs a regulator/puts in place regulatory institutions -
in effect choosing γ, how green the regulatory regime should be. The chosen
γ is common knowledge.
• Stage 2: (R&D game) The regulated firm (insider) and a specialist entrepreneur
(outsider) invest independently in developing pollution-abatement technolo-
gies. Once developed, their technologies are patented and common knowledge.
• Stage 3: (Regulation) The regulator observes the set of available technologies
and sets the abatement standard.
• Stage 4: (Market for technology) The regulated firm chooses between using
its in-house technology or licensing the outsider’s technology for a fee.
Some key elements of our model’s structure merit emphasis. One, the choice
of γ is assumed to be credibly fixed: this fits with the interpretation of it being
descriptive of regulatory institutions and practices. It may be feasible to change
such institutions ex post, but such changes might be expected to be slow or face
practical hurdles.
Two, the regulator is assumed, in stage 3, to set standards after observing the
technologies that have been developed. A sufficient – though demanding – assump-
tion for this would be that the regulator can observe R&D efforts directly. In fact,
the weaker assumption that the regulator is able to observe patents suffices. Reg-
ulation is conditioned only on the characteristics of the best-available technology
which, in the equilibrium of interest, ‘belongs’ to the outside innovator who will
always benefit from patenting to prevent free adoption of his technology.7
7In theory an insider could choose not patent his superior in-house innovation if, for example,
deploying an outsider’s inferior technology allowed for weaker regulation. In the model here,
however, this is never the case.
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Three, the regulator is unable to commit to a regulatory standard before the
innovation outcome is known, As such our model fits into the “regulatory ratchet”
part of the literature – Puller (2006) provides a recent example – rather than the
“technology-forcing” part in which the regulator moves first with the intention of
influencing R&D programs. It should become obvious that if the regulator is allowed
to move before the R&D game and with commitment, then the strategic delegation
element of the setting is lost and principal can never do better than appoint a
regulator sharing his tastes (that is, an unbiased one).
As usual, we solve the model backwards.
2.1 The market for technology
Let the innovation expenditures for the insider and outsider be ri and ro, resulting
in abatement technologies that have unit costs c(ri) and c(ro) respectively. We make
no a priori assumptions about the level of ri relative to ro but distinguish between
two kinds of outcomes. With deterministic innovation when ri ≥ ro the polluting
firm’s in-house technology has lower costs: we have c(ri) ≤ c(ro), so that the insider
uses his own technology. If so, the outsider gets no revenue.
In contrast, when ro > ri the outsider’s technology has lower abatement costs.
Both firms can potentially gain if the polluter licenses the outsider’s technology in
preference to using his own technology. For any required abatement level a, the
saving in total abatement costs from switching to the outsider’s technology is
a[c(ri)− c(ro)].
We assume the market for technology is efficient and the above surplus is split
between the outsider (technology licensor) and the insider (licensee) in proportions
β and (1 − β) respectively.8 So whenever ro > ri the insider adopts the outsider’s
8This is the usual bargaining solution in bilateral monopoly models: Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
provide a textbook treatment of such ‘cake-sharing’ games. Here 0 < β < 1 captures relative
bargaining power, and may be related to the degree of patience in an alternate-offer bargaining
game (Rubinstein, 1982), or the degree of protection afforded by the intellectual property rights
regime.
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technology in return for a license fee equal to
aβ[c(ri)− c(ro)].
This fee is increasing in the cost advantage of the outsider’s over the insider’s tech-
nology, in the relative bargaining power β of the outsider, and in the stringency of
the regulatory standard a. We summarize the outcome in the market for technology
as follows:
Remark 1 (Market for technology) If c(ro) ≥ c(ri) the polluting firm adopts its
in-house abatement technology. If c(ro) < c(ri) it adopts the outsider’s abatement
technology and pays license fee aβ[c(ri)− c(ro)].
2.2 Regulation
The regulator’s choice of abatement level a is based on his evaluation of the weighted
environmental benefits and financial costs of abatement activity. Abatement costs
depend, as detailed above, on the pollution-control technology used. Regulation is
forward-looking and – since R&D effort is already sunk – when evaluating abatement
costs the regulator takes the state of technology as given. It it important to empha-
size that he does not impose a technology to be used, but sets a standard anticipating
that the best-available technology will be adopted (in other words, he understands
Remark 1). Given innovation expenditures ro and ri, define rˆ(ri, ro) = max{ri, ro}
and cmin = c(rˆ). The choice of regulatory standard a will call for expenditure acmin
on abatement.
The environmental benefits of abatement are given as a smooth function b(a).
We make the usual assumption that environmental damage is increasing in pollu-
tion at an increasing marginal rate, implying that abatement benefits increase with
abatement level but at a decreasing rate: b′ > 0 and b′′ < 0.
A regulator with bias γ chooses abatement standard a to maximize the difference
between weighted benefits and costs
γb(a)− acmin. (1)
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Let a∗ maximize expression (1). Assuming an interior solution exists, it is implicitly
defined by
γb′(a∗) = cmin. (2)
Given our assumption that b′′ < 0, the sufficient second-order condition for a max-
imum is satisfied. The regulator sets the abatement standard at a level where the
weighted marginal benefit of abatement equals the marginal cost of abatement using
the best-available technology. This chosen standard is functionally dependent on rˆ
and γ, so that we write the regulatory stringency function as a∗ = a(rˆ, γ).
Our assumptions about the costs and benefits of abatement imply that
∂a
∂γ
= − b
′(a∗)
γb′′(a∗)
> 0, (3)
and
∂a
∂rˆ
=
c′(rˆ)
γb′′(a∗)
> 0. (4)
In words, other things being equal, stricter standards will result when the regulator
is greener or when higher R&D expenditure leads to cheaper abatement technologies.
Also, for analytical tractability, we make the following assumption on the regulatory
choice function:
Assumption 1 A greener regulator is no less responsive to better pollution control
technologies, that is, ∂
2a
∂rˆ∂γ
≥ 0.
This assumption warrants some discussion. Differentiating (3) with respect to rˆ
we get
∂2a
∂rˆ∂γ
= −1
γ
∂a
∂rˆ
[
b′′b′′ − b′b′′′
b′′b′′
]
.
Assumption 1 then amounts to the restriction that b′′b′′− b′b′′′ ≤ 0 at the regulatory
optimum. While the concavity of benefit function is standard (that is, b′ > 0 and
b′′ < 0), restrictions on third derivatives are – as ever – ad hoc. Nonetheless, it
is straight-forward to verify that the condition holds for commonly-used concave
functional forms, for example the logarithmic form b(a) = ln a, or the exponential
function b(a) = ak where k ∈ (0, 1). While we invoke this assumption at various
places, where relevant we note how altering this assumption affects our results.
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2.3 The green R&D game
We turn now to the R&D choices of the insider and outsider at the innovation
stage. Firms recognize that their payoff varies with their own choice and the choice
made by the other firm. Their payoffs, and hence their choices, also depend on the
anticipated regulatory response, a(rˆ, γ).
Our primary focus is on the case where both the insider and outsider choose
positive level of R&D. However, for completeness we also consider the case where
the outsider chooses to drop out of the innovation stage because it is not profitable.
Recall that the regulatory policy is conditioned on the best available pollution-
control technology which depends on rˆ = max{ri, ro}. Significantly, note that a(rˆ, γ)
does not vary with ri for ranges where ro > ri, and does not vary with ro when
ri > ro. With slight abuse of notation we write a(., .) as a function directly of ri
and ro, and denote the partial derivatives of this function with respect to innovation
expenditures as a′i and a
′
o, depending on the context.
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2.3.1 The outsider’s choice
The outsider chooses ro to maximize the revenue from licensing its technology net
of the costs of R&D. This is given as
Π(ri, ro, γ) =
−ro if ro ≤ ria(ro, γ)β[c(ri)− c(ro)]− ro otherwise.
To understand this, note that if ro ≤ ri, the outsider’s technology is no better than
the insider’s, so generates no revenue.
If ro > ri he is able to license his technology for a fee a(ro, γ)β[c(ri)− c(ro)] that
varies with the insider’s choice. Then the outsider’s optimal choice of R&D level,
r∗o > ri, is given by the first-order condition
Πo(ri, r
∗
o, γ) ≡ β[a′o(r∗o, γ)[c(ri)− c(r∗o)]− a(r∗o, γ)c′(r∗o)]− 1 = 0, (5)
9So more fully we would write a′i =
∂a
∂rˆ
∂rˆ
∂ri
and a′o =
∂a
∂rˆ
∂rˆ
∂ro
.
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provided the optimized value of profits Π(ri, r
∗
o, γ) ≥ 0. The non-negativity of
profits ensures the outsider’s participation: if profits were negative, the outsider
would prefer to opt out of the innovation stage. Note that it will never make sense
for the outsider to exceed the insider’s R&D expenditure by only a small amount
as license revenue would be too meagre to recoup R&D expenses. Further, the
outsider’s optimal profit is decreasing in ri (the envelope theorem provides a formal
demonstration) so that, given γ, there exists some ri – call it ri(γ) – such that
Π(ri, r
∗
o, γ) < 0 for all ri > ri(γ). Hence, if the insider spends above this critical
threshold, it is optimal for the outsider to drop out (or, formally, r∗o = 0 whenever
ri > ri(γ)).
We summarize the outsider’s optimal response to insider’s choice ri as a reaction
function Ro(ri; γ). For ri > ri(γ) we have Ro(ri; γ) = 0, for reasons described above.
If the insider’s expenditure is below this threshold, the outsider’s optimal choice is
positive. To see how the outsider’s choice varies with ri and γ in this range, total
differentiation of first-order condition (5) gives us
Πoidri + Πoodro + Πoγdγ = 0. (6)
It is easy to check that Πoi < 0 and Πoo < 0: if so, ∂Ro/∂ri = −Πoi/Πoo < 0.
Further, Assumption 1 is sufficient for Πoγ = βa
′′
oγ[c(ri)−c(ro)]−βa′γc′o to be positive,
so ∂Ro/∂γ = −Πoγ/Πoo > 0. We summarize this as follows:
Proposition 1 At any configuration in which both the insider and outsider engage
in R&D, other things equal
(a) an increase in the R&D spending of the insider will induce the outsider to
decrease his R&D spending;
(b) given Assumption 1, an increase in γ, the greenness of the regulator, will
induce the outsider to increase his R&D spending.
12
2.3.2 The insider’s choice
The insider chooses his R&D expenditure ri to minimize the sum of expected abate-
ment costs and R&D spending. The insider’s loss function is
I(ri, ro, γ) =
a(ri, γ)c(ri) + ri if ro ≤ ria(ro, γ)[c(ro) + β[c(ri)− c(ro)]] + ri otherwise.
The insider’s optimal choice varies with ro and γ, and can be represented by reaction
function Ri(ro; γ). For the case where the outsider’s technology is inferior the insider
falls back on his own technology. In this circumstance, the insider expects the
regulatory stringency to vary with his own level of R&D, so the insider must choose
ri to minimize a(ri, γ)c(ri)+ri. Ignoring the trivial outcome where r
∗
i = 0, an interior
minimum for this case is given by
Ii(r
∗
i ; γ) = a
′
i(r
∗
i , γ)c(r
∗
i ) + a(r
∗
i , γ)c
′(r∗i ) + 1 = 0. (7)
The solution r∗i to this equation defines the insider’s optimal reaction to ro = 0,
10
and can be denoted as Ri(0, γ). It is easy to check that Iii > 0 at the optimum,
but the sign of Iiγ is ambiguous. Notably Iiγ < 0 whenever the cross-partial a
′′
iγ is
relatively small, in which case Ri(0, γ) is increasing in γ.
11
Next, for configurations where ri < ro, the outsider’s technology is superior. In
this range, the insider’s costs are given as
I(ri, ro, γ) = a(ro, γ)[c(ro) + β[c(ri)− c(ro)]] + ri.
Here abatement standards and costs are driven by the superior technology, and
marginal changes in ri have no direct impact on the regulatory intensity.
12 R&D is
10We do not have to consider ri > ro > 0. As already established it is better for the outsider to
choose ro = 0 than a response in the above range. In other words, when looking for equilibria, we
can restrict attention to the cases where ro = 0 and ro > ri.
11The other case, where a′′iγ is positive and large, amounts to one where a greener regulator is
very responsive to innovation. Higher γ then lead the isolated insider to cut back on innovation to
avoid ratcheting of regulation.
12Bear in mind that we are dealing with partial derivatives here. In the equilibrium comparative
statics that we present below changes in ri will alter regulatory choices by influencing ro.
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costly but improves payoff by reducing the license fees paid to the outsider. Assum-
ing the insider’s problem has an interior solution in the interval ri ∈ (0, ro), it must
satisfy the first-order condition13
Ii(r
∗
i , ro, γ) = a(ro, γ)βc
′(r∗i ) + 1 = 0. (8)
Thus, the insider invests in R&D up to the point where its marginal cost equals the
marginal reduction in expected license payments. In this case the insider engages in
positive levels of R&D even though he recognizes that he will, ultimately, procure
abatement technology from outside. The technology he develops constitutes a fall-
back position and any improvement in that strengthens the bargaining position with
the outsider, reducing license fees. This is similar in spirit to the role of R&D by
incumbents in the ‘creative gale of destruction’ model of Gans and Stern (2000).
To identify the characteristics of the reaction function, Ri(ro; γ) in the range
where both firms innovate, we differentiate (8) to get
Iiidri + Iiodro + Iiγdγ = 0, (9)
where Iii = aβc
′′ > 0, Iio = a′oβc
′ < 0, and Iiγ = a′γβc
′ < 0. It follows directly that
∂Ri
∂ro
= −Iio
Iii
> 0,
∂Ri
∂γ
= −Iiγ
Iii
> 0.
These effects are intuitive. Higher values of ro or γ translate into more stringent
regulation, increasing the license fee paid to the outsider: in response, the insider
increases R&D to economize on these payments. In summary:
Proposition 2 At any configuration in which both the insider and outsider engage
in R&D, other things equal
(a) an increase in the R&D spending of the outsider will induce the insider to
13An interior solution results if aβc′(0)+1 < 0 and aβc′(ro)+1 > 0, which holds for ro sufficiently
large. Note that the second-order condition for a maximum is necessarily satisfied since c′′ > 0.
The corner solutions are as follows: If Ii(ri, ro, γ) is positive at ri = 0, it is optimal for the insider
to invest nothing. If on the other hand, Ii(ri, ro, γ) is negative everywhere in the interval [0, ro]
then it is optimal for the insider to match ri = ro.
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increase his R&D spending;
(b) an increase in γ, the greenness of the regulator, will induce the insider to
increase his R&D spending.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we note that an increase in the greenness pa-
rameter γ induces both the insider and outsider to increase their innovation activity.
They react differently to changes in each other’s R&D expenditure: an increase in
the insider’s R&D induces the outsider to decrease his R&D (the outsider’s reaction
function is downward sloping) while an increase in the outsider’s R&D induces the
insider to increase his activity (reaction function is upward-sloping.)
2.3.3 Equilibrium of the R&D game
For any given γ, a Nash equilibrium of the R&D game is a pair [r∗i (γ), r
∗
o(γ)] such
that r∗i (γ) = Ri(r
∗
o; γ) and r
∗
o(γ) = Ro(r
∗
i ; γ).
Two kinds of equilibria can arise depending on the parameter values (we ignore
the possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria). First, we may obtain equilibrium con-
figurations in which r∗i and r
∗
o are both positive – the insider and outsider both
engage in R&D. Such an outcome is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium when both innovate
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Second, recall that the outsider chooses Ro(ri; γ) = 0 for ri ≥ ri(γ). Then, if
Ri(0; γ) > ri(γ), we get an equilibrium in which the outsider drops out (r
∗
o = 0) and
the insider chooses r∗i = Ri(0; γ) > 0. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium when outsider drops out
2.3.4 Comparative statics: the impact of varying γ
In this sub-section we explore the impact of varying the greenness parameter γ on
the equilibrium outcome.
For equilibria in which the outsider drops out, the effect of varying γ is straight-
forward to analyze but potentially ambiguous. Higher values of γ raise the threshold
ri(γ) beyond which the outsider drops out but, as noted earlier, the isolated insider’s
response Ri(0; γ) is increasing in γ as long as the cross-partial a
′′
iγ is relatively small.
Equilibria in which both firms innovate offers analytically interesting possibili-
ties. Total differentiation of the relevant first-order conditions (5) and (7) gives, in
compact notation, [
Iii Iio
Πoi Πoo
][
dr∗i
dγ
dr∗o
dγ
]
=
[
−Iiγ
−Πoγ
]
.
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Using Cramer’s rule, we can check that
dr∗i
dγ
=
∣∣∣∣∣ −Iiγ Iio−Πoγ Πoo
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Iii IioΠoi Πoo
∣∣∣∣∣
> 0 and
dr∗o
dγ
=
∣∣∣∣∣ Iii −IiγΠoi −Πoγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Iii IioΠoi Πoo
∣∣∣∣∣
≷ 0.
Under Assumption 1, which implies Πoγ > 0, a higher value of γ increases the
insider’s equilibrium investment in R&D, while the impact on the outsider’s choice of
R&D is ambiguous.14 Figure 3 helps with intuition. Appointing a greener regulator
– setting a higher value of γ – shifts both reaction curves to the right. This, combined
with the upward slope of the insider’s reaction function leads to an unambiguous
increase in the insider’s equilibrium R&D level. For the outsider, higher γ has a
positive direct impact on R&D. But higher γ also stimulates the insider’s R&D
activity, which discourages the outsider’s R&D, so that the indirect effect pushes in
the opposite direction. The net effect could go either way.
-
6
6
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HHHHHH
HHHHHH

















ri
ro
Ri(ro)
Ro(ri)
Figure 3: Equilibrium impact of higher γ when both firms innovate
Recalling that it is the outsider’s technology that is used when both firms inno-
14Note sign
(
dr∗i
dγ
)
= sign
∣∣∣∣∣∣ + −− −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + −− −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0, while sign
(
dr∗o
dγ
)
= sign
∣∣∣∣∣∣ + +− −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + −− −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
is ambiguous.
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vate, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1, an increase in γ, the greenness of the regula-
tor, has an ambiguous impact on the quality of the best-available technology.15
3 How green is the ‘ideal’ regulator?
We begin by examining the social planner’s problem. Social welfare is the (un-
weighted) sum of the environmental benefits of abatement activity minus abatement
costs and R&D expenditures:
W (a, ri, ro) = b(a)− ac(rˆ)− ri − ro. (10)
How would a social planner maximize welfare if it can choose a, ri and ro directly?
In our setting with deterministic innovation there should be no duplication of R&D,
so at the first-best outcome one of ri or ro should equal 0. Without loss of generality
we can set ri = 0 so that ro = rˆ = r. The social planner’s problem reduces to: choose
a and r to maximize
b(a)− ac(r)− r, (11)
with first-order conditions for an interior maximum16
Wa = b
′(a)− c(r) = 0 (12)
Wr = −ac′(r)− 1 = 0 (13)
In words, at the first-best outcome all R&D effort is exerted by one firm to avoid
wasteful duplication.17 The regulatory standard is set such that the marginal cost
and benefit of abatement are equalized, taking technology as given. R&D effort is
15If alternative restrictions entail Πoγ < 0, the sign of
dr∗i
dγ is ambiguous, while the sign of
dro
dγ is
unambiguously negative. For this case appointing a greener regulator unambiguously weakens the
best-available technology.
16A sufficient second-order condition for this to be a maximum is that Waa = b′′ < 0 and
WaaWrr − (War)2 = −ab′′c′′ − (c′)2 ≥ 0.
17This follows from our assumption that the R&D process is deterministic. With a stochastic
element the first-best might involve splitting a given R&D ‘pot’ between the two parties.
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exerted up to the point at which the marginal savings in abatement costs equal the
marginal cost of R&D.
In our framework the social planner does not have direct control of ri and ro.
Those R&D choices are, however, sensitive to the regulatory regime. In appointing a
regulator or designing regulatory institutions, then, our planner faces a second-best
problem. The choice of γ impacts regulatory decisions both directly (that is for any
given pattern of technologies available) and indirectly (through influencing R&D
choices and therefore the pattern of technologies that emerge in equilibrium).
Denoting the choice of regulatory standard a(rˆ(γ), γ) = a˜(γ) we can express
social welfare as a function of γ,
W (γ) = b(a˜(γ))− a˜(γ)c(rˆ(γ))− r∗i (γ)− r∗o(γ). (14)
An interior, second-best, choice of regulatory parameter γ requires
dW (γ)
dγ
= [b′(a˜)− c(rˆ)]
(
da˜
dγ
)
− a˜c′(rˆ)drˆ
dγ
− dr
∗
i
dγ
− dr
∗
o
dγ
= 0, (15)
where da˜
dγ
=
(
∂a
∂γ
+ ∂a
∂r
dr˜
dγ
)
. Let γ∗ denote the value that optimizes W (γ). The
expression above allows us to identify the trade-offs involved in choosing γ∗, with
the terms capturing the welfare impact of marginal changes in γ through changes
induced in equilibrium values of a, ri and ro.
The first composite term in (15) relates static efficiency to choice of γ. To see
this observe that if we take technology as exogenous by imposing dri
dγ
= dro
dγ
= 0 then
this equation reduces to
dW
dγ
∣∣∣∣
dri
dγ
= dro
dγ
=0
= [b′(a˜)− c(rˆ)] ∂a
∂γ
= 0, (16)
which holds only if [b′(a˜)− c(rˆ)] = 0. This is the simple case in which regulatory
stringency a˜ equates the marginal benefit of abatement with its marginal cost. Com-
paring this condition with condition (2), the regulatory process in our model will
deliver this outcome only at γ∗ = 1. In other words, if technology development is
exogenous then the welfare-motivated social planner should delegate to an unbiased
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regulator. This is intuitive, and consistent with the often-stated conventional wis-
dom that regulatory institutions should be unbiased. If green technical change were
not sensitive to the regulatory setting then our analysis endorses the conventional
wisdom.
However, more generally in our setting innovation is not exogenous but, rather,
is influenced by the regulatory attitude. Improvement of dynamic efficiency, by
creating the incentives for the right level of innovation, provide a reason to bias the
regulatory attitude. Rearranging (15) gives
b′(a˜)− c(rˆ) =
(
a˜c′(rˆ)
drˆ
dγ
+
dr∗i
dγ
+
dr∗o
dγ
)/(
da˜
dγ
)
(17)
The expression on the right includes some terms whose signs are, in general, am-
biguous. However, whenever the right-hand side is non-zero, optimal γ will depart
from unity. Since b(a) is concave, if the expression on the right is positive, optimally
chosen γ∗ < 1: the social planner will wish to design regulatory institutions that ap-
parently under -weight environmental concerns. Conversely, if the expression on the
rights is negative optimal regulatory institutions should over -weight environmental
concerns.
Proposition 4 If the regulatory environment affects the innovation activity in the
regulated industry, unbiased regulatory institutions (that is, those embodying γ = 1)
will not in general be socially optimal.
While the arguments here are made in the context of a specific model, the un-
derlying intuition is quite general. Nonetheless does our model allow us to say more
about the direction of departure from unbiased regulatory institutions? The nor-
mative recommendation turns out to vary with the nature of the equilibria of the
innovation game, so we consider the two categories of equilibria separately.
3.1 Equilibria at which only insider innovates
We consider, first, equilibria where the outsider drops out (r∗o = 0), and the tech-
nology in use is the one developed by the insider (rˆ = r∗i ). This delivers the most
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straightforward prescription.
Comparing the insider’s choice of R&D, as given by equation (7), with the op-
timality condition (13), we find that the insider under-invests in R&D relative to
first-best. As in Puller (2006), it is rational for the polluter to under-invest because
this reduces the extent to which standards ratchet up in response to innovation.
Substituting from (7) in (17), we get
b′(a˜)− c(rˆ) =
(
−a′ic(ri)
dr∗i
dγ
)/(
da˜
dγ
)
. (18)
Recall that comparative-static analysis of condition (7) for the insider’s R&D
choice shows that, in general, the sign of dr∗i /dγ is ambiguous. But whenever the
insider’s optimal choice is increasing in γ (this happens as long as the cross-partial
a′′iγ is not too large), this expression is positive so that γ
∗ > 1.
Proposition 5 If a regulated firm uses its in-house abatement technology, unbiased
regulation results in socially sub-optimal levels of R&D. Second-best regulation calls
for a pro-environment bias (γ∗ > 1) whenever the firm’s R&D expenditure is
increasing in γ.18
3.2 Equilibria at which both firms innovate
Consider, next, equilibria where both insider and outsider engage in R&D. Here
r∗o > r
∗
i , so that the outsider’s technology is used (rˆ = r
∗
o). At this equilibrium the
R&D spending of the insider is redundant from the social point of view: the insider
only engages in it to drive down the license fees it anticipates having to pay to the
outsider for the use of its technology. As that fee is simply a transfer and so does not
affect aggregate welfare, the real resources incurred in the insider’s R&D activity
reduce welfare. Other things being the same, policies that reduce the insider’s R&D
expenditure can increase welfare.
The distortion of R&D incentives also depends on the parameter β that measures
18If the cross-partial effect dominates such that r∗i is decreasing in γ then the corrective bias
must be applied in the other direction.
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the division of surplus between the technology-supplier and the regulated firm.19
Higher values of β correspond to higher license revenue and spur the outsider towards
higher levels of R&D. Comparing condition (5) for the outsider’s R&D choice with
the social planner’s choice (13), we can see that when β is sufficiently close to 1, the
outsider overinvests relative to the social optimum: on the margin innovation leads
to ratcheting up of regulatory standards, increasing the profitability of innovation for
the outsider. In aggregate, the excess of R&D is even higher because the outsider’s
expenditure also causes the insider to escalate his expenditure to reduce license fees.
In this case the second-best outcome would call for a regulatory climate that,
on the margin, discourages R&D. Once again, whether this is achieved through a
regulatory regime biased in favor or against the environment depends on how r∗o
varies with γ. Substituting from (5) in (17) while setting rˆ = r∗o, we get
b′(a˜)− c(rˆ) = [βa
′
o(c(ri)− c(ro)) + (1− β)a(ro)c′o] dr
∗
o
dγ
+
dr∗i
dγ
da˜
dγ
. (19)
The terms in the numerator are positive except for c′o (which is negative) and
dr∗o/dγ (whose sign, recall, is ambiguous). We can assess optimal policy in various
cases. Consider the case where dr∗o/dγ is positive at γ = 1. Then, for relatively large
β the right hand side of (19) is positive, and to achieve the second-best outcome we
must discourage over-investment in R&D by setting γ∗ < 1.
Proposition 6 Where a regulated firm uses an abatement technology supplied by
an outsider with strong bargaining power, unbiased regulation results in socially ex-
cessive levels of R&D. Second-best regulation calls for a bias against the envi-
ronment (γ∗ < 1) whenever the outsider’s R&D expenditure is increasing in γ.
Contrast this with the previous proposition: even though the best-available tech-
nology is assumed to respond positively to γ in both cases, the required corrective
bias in regulatory attitude differs in direction. The former case calls for a regulator
19Throughout we treat β as an exogenous characteristic of the market for technology. The analy-
sis could be extended to make β something amenable to policy influence through direct regulatory
intervention in the market for compliance technologies, or through design of intellectual property
rights. If the regulator were able to control both γ and β first-best becomes implementable.
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who is green relative to the neutral benchmark, the latter for one who is relatively
brown.
The case in which the term in square brackets in front of dr∗o/dγ in expression (19)
is zero offers an interesting possibility. Here equations (5) and (13) are equivalent and
the outsider has the incentive to engage in what would be, for an isolated firm, the
socially-optimal level of R&D. Nonetheless the outcome involves socially-wasteful
duplication by the insider as it over-invests in order to reduce the fee it anticipates
having to pay to the outside innovator. In this case regulatory institutions should
have a bias against the environment.20
Once again, other – in our view less natural – assumptions about how R&D
responds to γ could deliver contrary recommendations. For example, if dr∗o/dγ < 0
the desirable dampening of socially-excessive R&D would require setting γ∗ > 1 (a
pro-environment bias). But this only reinforces our central contention: while the
second-best entails choosing biased regulators, the direction of the optimal bias is
sensitive to the specificities of the innovation process. But in a significant departure
from the literature, we can find circumstances that justify bias in either direction.
4 Conclusions
Environmental regulation aims to correct static market failures due to externali-
ties but also to provide incentives for innovation and adoption of better abatement
technologies. Given the potential role of technological improvements in mitigating
environmental problems, the latter objective is important in practice. We provide
what we believe to be a fairly robust argument that institution of an unbiased reg-
ulatory regime – one who pursues social welfare as an objective function – will not
be efficient.
While the case for diverging from unbiased regulation is quite general, the direc-
tion of the bias – whether the ideal regulator should be relatively green or brown
– depends on the specificities of the innovation process. In the conventional set-
ting which assumes that innovation is carried out by the polluting firms themselves,
20We are grateful to a referee for pointing out the interpretation in this special case.
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firms tend to under-invest in R&D in order to dampen the ratcheting up of regula-
tion in response to innovation. If a pro-environment bias in the regulatory regime
spurs innovation, appointing a green regulator can correct this tendency towards
under-investment.
We extended the existing literature on regulation and environmental innovation
to allow – in a manner consistent with observation – for R&D activity from both
the polluting sector and from specialist outsiders such as engineering companies. In
this setting the R&D effort of the polluting industry may be redundant from a social
point of view, but yet rational for the polluters if it improves the terms on which
they license the technology developed by the outsider. When innovation outcome
depends on the strategic interaction between insiders and outsiders, the welfare
outcome and policy prescription are potentially more complicated: duplication of
R&D efforts, and especially the escalation of insider’s innovation to reduce the cost
of licensing the outsider’s technology, can lead to over-investment in R&D. This
may call for an anti-environment bias whenever it serves to temper this excessive
innovation. Failing to account for the underlying regulatory distortions induced in
the market for innovation can lead to misinterpretation of observed behavior and to
inadequate policy prescription.
While the current paper reports an essentially theoretical exercise, it sheds light
on how the optimal bias varies with actual context. For instance, if compliance
technologies are already believed to be mature – in the sense of there being little
scope for their improvement – the optimal value of γ converges to one. The prescrip-
tion can be suitably modified for other scenarios, say, to countries where domestic
polluters rely on foreign-developed pollution control technologies, or settings where
the polluting sector has – for whatever reason – no innovation capability.
We could extend our model in a number of ways. For tractability, we resorted to
the simplifying assumption that there exists a single insider and a single outsider.
We can outline how our findings might differ for alternative structures in the market
for innovation. We could allow for multiple upstream entrepreneurs (effectively an
“environmental services” industry) competing to supply abatement technologies to
a monopolistic polluting firm.21 With multiple outsiders the polluter would expect,
21In a static setting without R&D, David and Sinclair-Desgagne (2005) emphasize the importance
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other things being equal, to pay lower license fees to use any particular technology: in
crude form, we could capture this in lower value of the appropriability parameter β.
This would reduce the outsiders’ incentive to innovate, and in so doing, the strategic
motivation for innovation by the insider too. In contrast, a structure in which
a single upstream outsider offers his environmental services to multiple polluters
would display strong incentives for the outsider to innovate: license revenue would be
boosted both by the number of downstream potential licensees and possibly through
improved bargaining power with respect to any one of them. Higher innovation by
the outsider would prompt more R&D expenditure by insiders too, which would be
duplicative and therefore socially wasteful.
For the purposes of this paper we have focused on quantitative environmental
standards, in part because these are quite prevalent in the context of environmental
regulation. As Brozovic´ (2002: 1) notes: “Our profession’s fondness for the use
of economic incentives notwithstanding, regulation via direct quantitative control
is commonplace in the real world. Diverse consumer and producer activities, from
speeds on public thoroughfares to the emissions of pollutants from smokestacks, are
controlled using maximum allowable limits.” We could have considered other instru-
ments and, indeed, there is a large literature on instrument choice and innovation
(see Jaffe and Stavins (2002)). It would be an interesting in future work to consider
the performance of other regulatory instruments, in particular market-based instru-
ments, within our framework. Tradeable permits have, for example, taken on an
important role in the climate change setting. A substantial literature has sought to
investigate the positive and normative implications of tradeable permits and green
taxes – Requate (2005a) provides an excellent survey – though never in a setting co-
habited by internal and external technology developers. With tradable permits, for
example, buying permits to pollute would be a substitute for abatement such that
an analysis would require the R&D market and permit market to be in equilibrium
simultaneously. An emissions tax might be expected to act in a similar way, giving
an external ‘price’ to units of emissions against which emissions reductions gener-
ated by installation of abatement-technologies would have to ‘compete’. This would
impact the market for technology and so also the research incentives for insiders and
of the degree of competition in the industry supplying pollution control technologies for the optimal
regulation of polluters.
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outsiders in potentially complex ways.
However, regardless of the chosen instrument, our central insight is durable: with
limited instruments, calibrating the instrument to correct the static externality may
distort incentives to innovate, and that seemingly biased regulation may be a second-
best device to reconcile these objectives. The precise nature of the desired bias will
depend on how the policy instrument interacts with innovation and adoption of new
technologies but, importantly, could feasibly lie in either direction relative to the
standard, neutral case.22
A more complex analysis might also model the research and development pro-
cess itself in a more sophisticated way. In designing the model presented here we
deliberately chose the simplest approach to modeling the outputs of R&D, with the
‘quality’ of pollution-control technology developed being a deterministic function of
R&D effort. Of course there are other ways of modeling R&D competition that
involve stochastic returns to research effort as, for example, in a patent race. This
complicates the analysis of the strategic interaction in the innovation process (inno-
vation outcomes cannot be ordered simply by research effort) and also the welfare
evaluation (duplicating R&D is not necessarily wasteful if multiple research units
increase the likelihood of at least one successful innovation). The model could also
be developed, as we have noted, to take allow for the possibility of research joint ven-
tures, which are observed to be important in some green-technology settings. These
extensions add considerably to the complexity of our model but offer valuable seams
for future research.
22Where multiple instruments can be used in combination, there is a temptation to believe that
the inconsistency problem can be circumvented altogether. For instance, static pollution externality
could be corrected through quantitative standards, and direct subsidies or taxes can be used to
generate the optimal level of R&D. But such regimes may be inherently complex: for instance,
where innovation is potentially carried out by outsiders and insiders with differing incentives to
innovate, the tax or subsidy regime may need to treat them differently.
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